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One of the major reasons why inventors are awarded patents by governments is they encourage R&D 
investments and commercialization of inventions. If the patent holder commercializes his invention, he 
has stronger incentives to retain the patent. The purpose here is to empirically analyze the relationship 
between commercialization and the renewal of patents. At the same time, I take into account defensive 
patent strategies (e.g. deterring competitors from utilizing the patent) and pointedly ask if there are any 
third factors (quality of the patent) that affect the commercialization and renewal decisions. Using a 
detailed  database  of  Swedish  patents,  I  utilize  a  survival  model  to  estimate  how  commercialization 
influences the patent renewal decision. Basic results show commercialization and defensive strategies 
increase the probability a patent will be renewed, but also that quality influences commercialization and 
renewal decisions. When controlling for endogenous commercialization decision, there is still a strong 
positive relationship between commercialization and renewal of patents. Thus, given the quality of the 
patent, if the owner decides to commercialize the patent on the margin, this leads to longer survival of the 
patent. With regard to commercialization modes, there is some evidence licensed patents and patents 
commercialized  in  original  and  new  firms  –  but  not  acquired  patents  –  survive  longer  than  non-
commercialized patents. Looking more closely at the contracts of acquired and licensed patents, contracts 
with both variable and fixed fees – but not contracts with either variable or fixed fees – survive longer 
than non-commercialized patents. However, the analysis about modes and contract terms does not take 
into account the endogeneity problem. 
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A steady stream of inventions and innovations are necessary for economic growth. But 
in a free market technological spillovers cause underinvestment in R&D. To solve this 
problem, a government can either subsidize private R&D or grant exclusive rights – 
patents  –  to  the  technology  creators.  The  motivation  behind  granting  patents  for 
inventions are thus transparent, aiming to: 1) give incentives to inventors to create and 
commercialize inventions and new technologies; 2) disclose, diffuse and standardize 
new technologies; and 3) facilitate contracts (licensing/ownership) between inventors 
and producers (Scotchmer 2006). In this view the inventor files and retains a patent to 
protect an invention that he himself commercializes or sells/licenses to somebody else. 
Without the patent the technology behind the invention would be free to use for anyone.  
However,  patents  are  often  filed  and  retained  for  non-innovative  purposes 
(Granstrand 1999, Cohen et al. 2000): 
  Defending other related patents in the firm’s patent portfolio (shadow patents). 
  Preempting competitors from entering specific technological fields or patenting 
related inventions (patent fences). 
  Building up portfolios of patents which can be traded or cross-licensed. 
  Signaling investors prior to an initial public offering about the value of the firm. 
  Defending the firm against litigation lawsuits. 
 
The  main  purpose  of  the  present  study  is  to  analyze  how  important  the 
commercialization  decision  is  for  keeping  (renewing)  patents.
1  But defensive  patent 
strategies are also taken into account in the analysis, and possible background variables 
which  might  simultaneously  affect  commercialization  and  renewal   decisions  are 
explored. For example, one could expect that high quality patents  would have a high 
probability  of  being  both  renewed  for  long  periods   and  commercialized.  In  the 
literature, the renewal of patents is often seen as the best measure of the private value of 
patents (Pakes and Schankerman 1984). Thus, more valuable patents should survive for 
longer periods. A  secondary purpose is to decompose the commercialization decision 
                                                 
1 Commercialization here means the original owner of the patent has either: 1) sold the patent; 2) licensed 
the patent; 3) introduced a new product based on the patent on the market in his own, existing firm; or 4) 
introduced a new product on the market in his own, new firm. Thus, a minimum requirement is that the 
patent  has  generated  some  income  to  the  owner.  However,  commercialization  does  not  need  to  be 
profitable for the original owner. This definition is similar to those made in previous studies on the 
commercialization of patents; see e.g. Griliches (1990) and Morgan et al. (2001).  
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into four different modes – 1) commercialization in the original firm or 2) in a new firm, 
3) patent is licensed or 4) sold to an external firm – and then relate these to the patent 
renewal decision. Finally, I will look more closely at the contract terms of sold and 
licensed patents. Both variable and fixed fees can be included in such contracts, and the 
contract design will give different incentives to inventors and firms to make an effort 
during commercialization (see section 2.2). 
The present study is exploratory in nature and applies both descriptive statistics 
and econometric analysis to the research questions above. I use a detailed data set of 
Swedish patents granted to small firms and individuals, based on a survey conducted in 
2003  and  2004.  The  survey  response  rate  was  80  percent.  The  data  set  includes 
information on if, when and how the patent was commercialized, the renewal pattern, 
patent quality indicators (forward citations), as well as the payment structure (variable 
and/or  fixed  fees)  of  acquired  and  licensed  patents.  The  model  and  the  statistical 
estimations are based on the assumption that more valuable patents are renewed for 
longer periods. This assumption has also been made in previous patent renewal studies 
(see e.g. Schankerman and Pakes 1986). I use a Cox survival model to analyze the 
determinants of patent renewal. It tests how different explanatory variables affect the 
probability of patents being renewed, and thereby indirectly determine patent values. 
The renewal decision here is an option to keep the patent. To the best of my knowledge, 
no previous study has related the commercialization and patent renewal decisions to 
each other – mainly due to a lack of data. 
The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, previous studies are discussed. 
The  data  set  is  described  in  section  2,  including  summary  statistics.  The  statistical 
survival models are outlined in section 3. In section 4, the explanatory variables are 
described. The results from the empirical estimations are presented in section 5, and the 
final section draws general conclusions. 
 
2. Previous literature 
2.1 Determinants of patent renewal 
Most  previous  studies  analyzing  renewal  of  patents  have  estimated  the  value 
distribution of patents (Griliches 1990, Pakes 1986, Schankerman and Pakes 1986). All 
of these studies assume more valuable patents are renewed for longer periods than less 
valuable ones. It is assumed owners only renew patents if it is economically profitable 
to do so. The percentage of renewed patents indicates how large a share of the patents  
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have an economic value after a given number of years. Schankerman and Pakes (1986) 
estimate both the distribution of the patent values and their rate of depreciation. They 
show about half of the European patents continue to be renewed after 10 years, but only 
10  percent  are  renewed  during  the  entire  statutory  period.  According  to  Griliches 
(1990), most patents have a low value that depreciates rapidly. Only a few patents have 
a very high value. 
There are some studies that have analyzed determinants of patent renewal. Using 
American patent data, Serrano (2008) finds acquired patents have a higher probability 
of being renewed than non-acquired ones. Harhoff et al. (1999) show that German and 
U.S. patents that were renewed during the entire statutory period were cited more often 
than expired patents. They conclude patents with economic value get cited more often. 
Maurseth (2005) is the only previous study to use a survival model to estimate 
how  different  factors  influence  patent  renewal.  Relying  on  an  intuitive  distinction 
between citations across and within technology fields, he finds patents which receive 
citations across fields survive longer than average, whereas those with citations within 
fields expire earlier. The interpretation is citations across technology fields indicate a 
scientific  breakthrough,  whereas  citations  within  fields  indicate  many  competing 
patents. 
With  regard  to  patent  renewal  studies,  Maurseth  (2005)  is  the  most  closely 
related paper to the study at hand, since both use survival model estimations. However, 
they differ in several key respects. First, Maurseth’s study is based on a data set of  
Norwegian patents granted by the European Patent Office (EPO), while this paper is 
concerned  with  data  on  Swedish  patents.  Second,  whereas  Maurseth  studies  patent 
citations, in addition to patent citations I analyze different commercialization variables. 
And finally, the empirical model specification has been improved, taking into account 
that a granted patent cannot expire until it has been granted. 
 
2.2 Incentives to include variable and fixed fees 
When a patent is licensed or acquired, further inventor cooperation might be required 
during commercialization. Most inventions need to  be adapted to  market  conditions 
before  commercialization  and  the  necessary  technical  knowledge  might  be  the 
inventor’s private information. By engaging the inventors, ex post, the external firm also 
avoids competing with possible follow-up inventions from the inventors. Jensen and 
Thursby (2001) conclude many licensed university inventions are so embryonic that  
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continued  engagement  by  inventors  is  necessary  for  71  percent  of  the  licensed 
inventions.  I  argue  here  that  further  cooperation  by  the  inventors  is  needed  for 
inventions in general in assuring commercialization. Braunerhjelm and Svensson (2010) 
found  inventors  play  an  active  role  in  87  percent  of  all  commercialized  patents 
originating from small firms and individuals. 
Jensen and Thursby (2001) point out that when licensing contracts rely uniquely 
on fixed fees (upfront or annual fees) there is a moral hazard problem with regard to 
inventor  effort.  For  the  external  firm,  licensing  with  royalty  payments  is  therefore 
preferable. Royalties link the inventor’s license income to the external firm’s output, the 
performance of the invention, and hence to inventor effort. This moral hazard problem 
also applies to acquired patents.
2 
When acquisition and licensing contracts rely uniquely on variable fees  (and 
hence lack fixed fees) there is another moral hazard problem (Dechenaux et al. 2009). 
Commercialization requires investment by the external firm, but the firm’s true agenda 
is private information and concealed from the inventor. For example, the licensee may 
intentionally  “shelve”  the  invention  for  strategic  reasons,  in  an  attempt  to  block 
competing firms from developing the invention, or to protect other existing patents of 
the licensee. The shelving may also be unintentional if the firm realizes the expected 
profits are lower than the firm’s required rate of return at any stage of development. By 
including fixed (upfront or annual) fees in the contract, Dechenaux et al. (2009) show 
the external firm has an incentive to commercialize the invention, and hence signals its 
intentions to the inventor. 
One  would  expect  acquired/licensed  patents  with  contracts  including  both 
variable and fixed fees to perform better ex post than patents with contracts that rely 
uniquely on either variable or fixed fees. Both inventors and the external firm then have 
incentives to make an effort during commercialization. Heretofore this hypothesis has 
not been tested empirically.
3  
                                                 
2  In  principle,  if  contracts  could  be  complete  there  would  be  no  difference  between  licensing  and 
acquisition (Tirole 1988). Consequently, I focus on different payment terms when analyzing the contracts, 
rather than on the distinction between licensing and acquisition. 
3  A closely related study is Dechenaux  et  al.  (2008),  who  investigate  different  factors  affecting  the 
commercialization decision of licensed university inventions, using a model based on optimal stopping. 
They use a Hazard model to estimate the determinants of when the licensee decides to terminate the 
license, commercialize the invention or delay the commercialization. They claim the importance of lead 
times induces the licensee to delay the commercialization until they have developed the product. On the 
other  hand,  patent  scope  and  learning  increase  the  probability  of  commercialization.  The  Hazard  of 
terminating  a  license  decreases  with  the  effectiveness  of  patent  strength  and  secrecy.  However,  
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There are also other reasons to include variable and fixed fees in the contracts. If 
the future sales of a particular invention are highly uncertain, including variable fees is a 
way to share risks and profits between the licensor and licensee. The licensee will then 
avoid high payments in the case of a bad invention (Bosquet et al. 1998). Another 
argument is based on asymmetric information. If the inventor has private information 
about  the  invention,  then  he  can  signal  confidence  of  its  presumed  high  value  by 
offering a contract which relies heavily on royalties. In the event the invention is not 
good,  this  requires  low  payments  (Gallini  and  Wright  1990,  Kamien  1992).  This 
argument about signaling is important since it establishes the perception the contract 
terms might well depend on the quality of the invention and thus are endogenous. A 
contract with only fixed fees is justified by the fact that royalties increase marginal costs 
of using the invention, and consequently suppresses the amount the licensee is willing 
to pay to the licensor (Kamien et al. 1992). Also, the licensor may simply prefer fixed 
fees, as this eliminates the need to monitor the licensee’s output. 
 
3. Database and descriptive statistics 
I use a detailed data set on patents granted to small firms (less than 1000 employees) 
and individual inventors.
4 The data set is based on a survey conducted in 2003-04 on 
Swedish patents granted in 1998. In that year, 1082 patents were granted to Swedish 
small firms and individuals.
5 The sample selection is not a problem, as long as the 
conclusions are drawn for small firms and individuals located in Sweden. Information 
about inventors, applying firms and their addresses as well as application dates for each 
                                                                                                                                               
Dechenaux et al. (2008) present no information on the payment structure of the licensing contracts. My 
study complements their research by relating terms of payment to patent renewal. 
4 All inventions do not result in patents. However, since an invention that does not result in a patent is 
seldom registered anywhere, there are two basic problems with empirically analyzing the invention or 
innovation (commercialized invention) rather than the patent. First, it is difficult to find these new ideas, 
products and developments among all the firms and individuals, whereas all patents are registered. 
Second, even if the inventions are found, it is difficult to judge whether they are sufficient improvements 
to qualify as inventions. Only the national and international patent offices make such judgements. 
Therefore, focusing on patents rather than all inventions is inherently much easier for an empirical study 
of the commercialization process. However, the CIS database on innovations in the EU is an exception to 
this rule, since it covers both patented and unpatented innovations (CIS 2010).  
5 In 1998, 2760 patents were granted in Sweden. 776 of these were granted to fore ign firms, 902 to large 
Swedish firms with more than 1000 employees, and 1082 to Swedish individuals or firms with less than 
1000 employees. In a pilot survey carried out in 2002, it turned out large Swedish firms refused to 
provide information on individual patents. Furthermore, it proved very difficult to persuade foreign firms 
to answer fill-in questionnaires about patents. These firms are almost always large multinationals firms.  
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patent,  was  received  from  the  Swedish  Patent  and  Registration  Office  (PRV). 
Thereafter, a questionnaire was sent out to the inventors of the patents.
6  
The questionnaire asked the inventors about the work place where the invention 
was created, if and  when   the invention had been commercialized, which kind of 
commercialization mode was chosen, and whether the contract terms of the licensed and 
acquired patents included variable and/or fixed fees, etc . 867 (out of 1082) inventors 
filled in and returned the questionnaire,   i.e., the response rate was 80 percent .  The 
falling off is not systematic with respect to IPC-classes or regions.
7 The response rate is 
satisfactorily high,  given that  such a database has seldom been collected before and 
inventors or applying firms normally consider information about inventions and patents 
confidential.  The data set was later complement ed with data on patent renewal and  
forward citations from the Espacenet (2010) website. 
In Sweden, patent owners must pay an annual renewal fee to PRV to keep their 
patents in force.  The patent expires  if the renewal fee is not paid in any  single year,. 
Thus, the patent owner every year has an option to renew the patent. A patent can only 
expire at a fixed date every year, on the anniversary of the original application date. In 
1999, the size of the renewal fees was increasing annually, ranging from 200 SEK in the 
first year to 4 300 SEK in the last year, adding up to total of about 35 000 SEK over 20 
years.
8 The Swedish renewal fees are modest compared to those for EPO and American 
patents (van Pottelsberghe and Francois 2009).
9 
  The commercialization and survival rates of the 867 patents  by firm size are 
described in Table 1. 408 patents (47 percent of the sample) were granted to individuals, 
                                                 
6 Each patent always has at least one inventor and often an applying firm as well. The inventors or the 
applying firm can be the owner of the patent, but the inventors can also own the patent indirectly, via the 
applying firm. Sometimes, the inventors are only employed in the applying firm, which owns the patent. 
If the patent had more than one inventor, the questionnaire was sent to only one of the inventors. 
7 Of the 20% non-respondents, 10% of the inventors had old addresses, 5% had correct addresses but 
none responded, and the remaining 5% refused to participate. The only inf ormation we have about the 
non-respondents is the IPC-class of the patent and the region of the inventors. For these variables, there 
was no systematic difference between respondents and non-respondents. 
8 In 1999, the annual fees for the 20 years in ascen ding order were: 200, 250, 350, 550, 700, 900, 1 100, 
1350, 1 600, 1 900, 2 250, 2 500, 2 700, 2 850, 3 050, 3 300, 3 550, 3 800, 4 050 and 4 300 SEK. 
9 According to Van Pottelsberghe and Francois (2009), the total cost for a patent which is renewed for 20 
years is EUR 120 000 (40 000) in 13 (3) EPO member states, EUR 14 500 in the U.S. and EUR 17 300 in 
Japan. High costs include procedural costs (official costs up to  the grant date) and external services that 
the inventor/firm needs when filing the patent.   EPO patents are much more expensive due to high 
translation costs – the granted patent must be translated and validated in each targeted national patent 
office. The other reason why EPO patents are more expensive is higher annual renewal fees (which vary 
with the duration of the protection). The authors show that renewal fees for 20 years in the EPO system 
are EUR 89 000 (22 000) in 13 (3) member states, whereas this cost is considerably lower in the U.S. and 
Japan. However, the renewal fees in a single European country like Sweden are of a modest amount.  
 
7 
and  116,  201  and  142  patents  were  granted  to  medium-sized  firms  (101-1000 
employees), small firms (11-100 employees) and micro companies (2-10 employees), 
respectively.
10 The commercialization rate for the whole sample is 61 percent .
11 The 
commercialization rate for the firms ranges from 66 to 74 percent, in contrast  to the rate 
of  51  percent  for   individuals.  A  contingency-table  test  indicates  a  statistically 
significant difference between the commercialization rates of firms and individuals. The 
chi-square value is 30.6 (with 3 d.f.), significant at the one percent level. The survival 
rate is increasing with the firm size, rising from 44 percent for individuals to 76 percent 
for medium-sized firms. A  contingency-table test  indicates a statistically significant 
difference between firm size categories. The chi -square value is  46.7 (with 3 d.f.), 




Table 2 compares commercialized  and renewed patents. As expected, patents 
still alive in 2004   (71 percent) have been commercialized to a higher degree than 
expired  ones  (48  percent).  The  chi -square  test  shows  the  independence  of 
commercialization and renewal can be rejected. However, 35 percent (186 of 526) of 
the commercialized patents  have already expired. This is  due either to the products 
having a short lifecycle or failed commercialization. 42 percent (142 of 341) of the non-
commercialized patents were alive in 2004. If most  of these patents  were defensive, 
with the purpose of defending existing patents, then the owner should have more similar 
granted patents. Among the commercialized patents in our database, 46 percent of the 
owners have at least one  additional  similar patent. Among the non -commercialized 
patents, this percentage is only 33 percent. If the patent had not been commercialized, 
the inventor was asked why the patent had not been commercialized. Among the 341 
non-commercialized patents, only 15 inventors listed shadow -patenting as one of the 
                                                 
10 The group of individual inventors includes private persons, self-employed inventors as well as two-
three inventors, who are organized in trading companies or private firms without employees. 
11 This rate should be compared to the few available studies which have measured commercialization of 
patents: 47 percent for American patents found by Morgan  et al. (2001) and 55 percent in the studies 
surveyed by Griliches (1990).
11 The higher commercialization rate in the present study is explained by the 
fact that only patents owned by small firms and inventors are included  – large (multinational) firms have 
many more defensive patents. Griliches (1990) confirms this view and reports the commercialization rate 
is 71 percent for small firms and inventors.  
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reasons  why  the  patent  had  not  been  commercialized.
12  I  draw the conclusion  that 
retaining  patents for strategic reasons is not common among individuals and small 




In Table 3, the commercialization and renewal decisions are related to the quality of 
patents, measured as  the number of  forward citations  to the patents  or their patent 
equivalents from the application date to November 2007 (excluding self-citations). In 
the literature, forward citations are seen as the most reliable measurement of patent 
quality,  since  it  shows  how  important  the  patent  is  for  subsequent  patents  and 
inventions. Almost 60 % of t he patents (517 of 867) in the data set have no forward 
citations at all, indicating a low value. Moreover, just 5 % (45 of 867) have more than 5 
forward  citations.  By  testing  differences  between  means,  it  turns  out  b oth  the 
commercialization and renewal decisions are positively related to forward citations. For 
example, commercialized patents have 1.39 citations on average in contrast to 0.95 for 
non-commercialized patents – and the difference is statistically significant. However, 
the  patents  have  different  application  dates,  implying  patents  with  early  application 
dates should be more frequently cited. Therefore, the number of forward citations per 
patent is measured per five-year period (in the bottom of Table 3), but this does not alter 
the results between groups. A similar pattern can be observed for both for patents still 
alive in 2004 and expired ones. The former group has more citations per patent and the 
differences between the groups are even more obvious. The results of Table 3 indicate it 
is not unlikely that the high quality of the patent is an important explanation to both the 
commercialization  and  renewal  decisions.  Thus,  a  part  of  the  positive  relationship 
between  commercialization  and  renewal  in  Table  2  can  be  explained  by  a  third 




                                                 
12 The most frequent reasons here were: 1) problems with financing (115 patents); 2) problems with 
marketing (75 patents); 3) problems in finding a manufacturing firm/licensor (74 patents); and 4) the 
product is not yet ready for commercialization (62 patents). Note that inventors may have mentioned 
more than one reason why the patent was not commercialized.  
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Table 4 shows how the patents were commercialized across firm groups. Most patents 
were commercialized within the firm that created the invention, hereafter called the 
original firm. In 71 cases, a new firm based on the patent was set up, while 46 patents 
were  licensed  and  19  were  sold.  None  of  the  medium-sized  firms  used  external 
commercialization (licensing or selling) as their first choice. The smaller the firm size, 
the higher the probability that the patent was sold or licensed. This result is in line with 
Serrano (2008), who found individual inventors and small firms sell their patents more 
often  than  large  firms  do.  New  firms  are  almost  exclusively  started  by  individual 
inventors in our sample. 
However,  the  patent  owner  can  later  decide  to  change  the  mode  of 
commercialization. As shown in the lower part of Table 4, this occurs for 47 patents in 
our sample  – most of which were  first commercialized in  the original  firm.  In this 
second round the pattern is quite different and external commercialization dominates, 
especially through selling the patent. In total, 56 patents were sold and 52 were licensed. 
75  patents  were  commercialized  in  new  firms,  which  constitute  14  percent  of  all 
commercialized patents. This is a somewhat higher level than for American patents, for 




Table 5 describes the renewal pattern across modes of commercialization. For 
each mode, it is shown how many patents were still alive in 2004 and had expired. As 
many as 43 percent of the acquired patents had expired, in contrast to 35 percent for 
licensed patents and 30-34 percent for patents commercialized in original or new firms. 
By looking more closely at expired patents, it turns out acquired patents on average 
survive less than three years after they have been acquired. The other groups of patents 
survive around four years after they have been commercialized. Thus, acquired patents 
expire with a higher probability. Given that they will expire, they expire faster measured 
from the commercialization time point compared to patents associated with other modes 
of commercialization. In the lower part of the table the average number of citations per 
patent across commercialization modes is shown. Licensed patents have considerably 
more citations than the other modes, but the differences are not significant, due in part 






The upper part of Table 6 displays basic information on the payment structure of 
acquired and licensed patents. An overwhelming majority (48 patents) of the acquired 
patents  include  only  a  fixed  fee,  while  the  remaining  eight  involve  both  fixed  and 
variable fees. By contrast, 30 licensed patents include both royalty payments linked to 
the turnover of the licensee and fixed fees (upfront or annual fees), while the remaining 
22 licensing contracts include only royalty payments.  
In the middle part of Table 6, it turns out that acquired/licensed patents with 
variable or fixed fees expire more frequently (46 percent) and survive for a shorter time 
(3.2 years), given that they expire, compared to those with both variable and fixed fees 
(26 percent and 3.7 years). This result is in line with the hypothesis that moral hazard 
problems with regard to commercialization effort arise if either variable or fixed fees 
are  excluded  from  the  acquisition/licensing  contract.  In  the  lower  part  of  Table  6, 
forward citations indicate the quality of contracts with both variable and fixed fees is 
somewhat higher than for contracts with either variable or fixed fees, but the difference 
is not significant. 
[Table 6] 
 
4. Theoretical background and statistical models 
4.1 Theoretical background 
Pakes and Schankerman (1984) have presented a model based on the assumption more 
valuable patents are renewed for longer periods. The patent owner must pay an annual 
renewal fee, Caj, to keep the patent in force. This fee varies with age a and cohort j of 
the patent.
13 The patent owner who pays the renewal fee earns the current implicit return 
to patent protection during the coming year,  Raj. Schankerman (1998) assumes that the 
pattern of Raj is known with certainty when the patent is applied for. If the owner does 
not pay the fee, the patent expires permanently and thereafter its returns are zero. The 
owner’s decision problem is then to maximize the discounted value of net returns by 
choosing the age at which to stop paying the renewal fee. Therefore, the owner chooses 
a lifetime, T, in order to solve the problem:
 14 
                                                 
13 All patents applied for in the same year belong to the same cohort. 
14 Since Swedish patents can only expire at  fixed annual dates, discrete time is used.  Maurseth (2005) 




where V is the value of patent protection given the optimal renewal decision, r is the 
discount factor and M is the statutory limit of patent protection (20 years). Provided that 
the path of net revenues (Raj – Caj) is non-increasing in age, the optimal rule for the 
owner is to renew the patent as long as the revenues cover the renewal costs, i.e. as long 
as Raj ≥ Caj.
15 When the net returns become negative, the owner should stop payment. If 
no such time point exists, the patent should be kept for the maximum life span (T=M). 
Thus, the renewal decision is an optimal stopping problem and the patents can be seen 
as options. The initial returns in a given cohort,  R0j, are allowed to vary across patents, 
but decay at the same rate, δaj. Thus, Rt+1 = δ Rt. If all patents in a cohort had the same 
initial returns and path of revenues, they would expire at the same age. Schankerman 
(1998) shows the survival function of patents can be written as a function of unknown 
parameters.  
 
4.2 Main statistical model 
Since  the  analysis  focuses  on  an  event  (expiration  of  patents)  to  occur,  survival 
(duration) analysis is used in the statistical estimations. The event in question is if and 
when the patent expires. First, I estimate a survival distribution function and a hazard 
function of the renewal pattern.
16 
In the main empirical analysis, I estimate how different explanatory factors (e.g. 
commercialization decision, patent quality, firm size, etc.) affect the decision to let the 
patents expire. The dependent variable, EXPTi, is a random variable showing how many 
years it takes until patent i expires, measured from the time point of patent application.
17 
Patents that have not yet expired in 2004 – the end point of observation – are “right-
censored” (480 observations). The other 387 patents expired in 2004 at the latest. Given 
this, the appropriate statistical model is the Cox (1972) proportional hazard model: 
                                                 
15 The renewal fees are non-decreasing in age. A sufficient condition for the net revenues to be non-
increasing in age is that the path of revenues, Raj, is non-increasing in age.  
16 The survival function, S(t), shows how a large share of the patents survives beyond a time point, t. The 
hazard function, h(t), shows the conditional probability of a patent expiring in a specific time period t, 
given that it has survived (not expired) until time point t. The hazard can also be expressed as a function 
of the probability density function, f(t), and the survival function: h(t) = f(t) / S(t) . 
17 The application year is the standard star ting time point to use. Information on the application year is 
directly available from the Swedish National Patent Office (PRV). 












where log λ0(t) is a baseline hazard function, t is the time in years, β and γ are vectors of 
parameters to be estimated, x1 is a vector of time independent explanatory variables, and 
x2(t) is a vector of time dependent explanatory variables.
18 The proportional hazard 
assumption  of  the model  means  the covariates  multiply  hazard. The  effect  of  an 
explanatory variable xk may, for example, halve the hazard of expiration at any time t. 
A patent obviously cannot expire until it has been granted, and thus is not in the 
risk set prior to this time point. If the owner had not paid the renewal fee for an applied 
patent before the patent was granted, the invention would neither have been granted a 
patent nor have been included in the data set. Therefore, I remove the patent from the 
risk set between the origin (application date) and the time point for granting patents. 
This procedure is called left truncation.
19 This is a valuable methodological extension 
beyond Maurseth (2005), who did not take this into account. 
An advantage with the Cox model compared to the alternative statistical model 
of  accelerated  failure  time  (see  Allison  1995)  is  that  time  dependent  explanatory 
variables  can  be  included  in  the  estimations.  The  present  study  exploits  this  and 
includes the time point of different commercialization modes of the patent since the 
mode can change over time. Another advantage of the Cox model is that there is no 
need  to  choose  between  different  residual  distributions.  Thus,  the  baseline  hazard 
function, log λ0(t), can be left unspecified. Finally, the Cox model makes it possible to 
interpret the quantitative effects in terms of how an increase in the explanatory variable 
affects the hazard ratio. 
 
4.3 Endogeneity and extended statistical models 
The commercialization decision will be included as an explanatory variable in equation 
(2).  If  the  patent  owner  commercializes  the  patent,  then  he  should  have  stronger 
incentives to keep the patent, as suggested in the introduction. However, an evident  
                                                 
18 The measurement of the number of years is an exact measure, since the owner must every year pay a 
renewal fee prior to the anniversary date of the original patent application. I therefore use a discrete 
approximation of the Cox model to account for the fact that two or more events may occur at the same 
point in time (Allison 1995). 
19 This is accomplished by defining a time-dependent covariate whose values are missing at times when 
the patent is not in the risk set. In practice this means patents will get a starting year of 1997 and the first 
possible year of expiration i s then 1998. Using the grant year as  the starting year in the model is not 
appropriate, since some of the time-dependent explanatory variables (in particular, those associated with 
the commercialization decision) change values between the application and the grant dates. 
  ) 2 ( , ) ( ) ( log log 2 1 0    t x x t EXPT h i i i    
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problem is both the commercialization and renewal decisions are taken by the patent 
owner. Thus, the commercialization decision is likely endogenous.  
  This raises the question of whether there is a reverse causality between renewal 
and  commercialization.  I  argue  here  this  is  not  likely  the  case,  since  the 
commercialization always starts before the patent expires – if both these events occur. 
In fact, there is not a single observation in the data set where a patent that already has 
expired is commercialized. It is rather that the expiration decision sets the limit for 
determining if a patent can be commercialized or not. If a patent filed in 1994 expires in 
2002 it cannot then be commercialized after this year. Instead, I argue the quality of the 
patent will drive the commercialization and renewal decision in the same direction – as 
indicated by the descriptive statistics in Table 3. 
In the extended econometrical analysis, I will start with estimating how patent 
quality and other explanatory variables affect the commercialization decision, since this 
decision is likely endogenous. Also, the commercialization decision is an event. It can 
occur directly after the patent has been filed. The variable COMTi shows how many 
years it takes until commercialization starts for patent i, measured from the time point of 
application date.  Patents  that have not  yet  been commercialized in  2003 are “right-
censored”  (337  observations).  Furthermore,  an  expired  patent  cannot  be 
commercialized. If the patent is not yet commercialized and expires before 2004, the 
patent is right-censored in this expiration year. 199 patents are right-censored before 
2003 due to expiration and 138 at the end point of observation. Measurement of the 
starting  point  of  commercialization  in  years  is  a  rather  rough  measure.  Therefore, 
COMT  is  “interval-censored”  for  the  commercialized  patents  (530  observations).
20 
Since interval-censored observations are included, the accelerated failure time (AFT) 
model is the appropriate statistical model (Allison 1995): 
 
where  is a random disturbance term, α is a vector of parameters and  is a parameter 
to be estimated, and z is a vector of explanatory variables. The ’s can have various 
                                                 
20 If the patent is commercialized within the first year, T obtains an interval-censored value between 0.1 
and 1, while the second year T is between 1.1 and 2, etc. 
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distributions, corresponding to different AFT-models, e.g. the log-normal, log-logistic, 
exponential, Weibull and gamma models.
21 
To take account of  the fact  that  when  analyzing the renewal decision  the 
commercialization  decision  is  likely  endogenous,  I  use  a n  instrument  variable 
technique. In the first step, an ordinary probit model is estimated to explain the decision 
to commercialize the patent or not . The dependent variable  COM is then a dummy 
variable, which equals 1 if the patent is commercialized and 0 otherwise: 
 
where Pi is the estimated probability that the patent is commercialized. F
-1 is the inverse 
of  the  cumulative  normal  distribution  function,  z  is  the  same  vector  of  explanatory 
variables as in equation (3) and δ is a vector of parameters. In the second step, the 
predicted value of COM is then included in the main Cox equation (2). An alternative 
would be to estimate a survival model in the first step (equation 3), to take into account 
the timing of the commercialization decision. However, such a statistical instrument 
variable technique with two succeeding survival equations in both the first and second 
steps has not yet been developed. 
 
5. Explanatory variables 
5.1 Main variables 
The explanatory variables consist of factors that are expected to affect, or be correlated 
with,  the  probability  that  a  patent  is  renewed  or  left  to  expire.  Patents  that  are 
commercialized or retained for defensive purposes are expected to survive longer than 
others (see introduction). Table 7 reports basic statistics on several explanatory factors. 
Hypotheses  are  shown  only  for  the  main  variables.  A  negative  (positive)  expected 
parameter  estimate  means  the  hazard  rate  of  letting  the  patent  expire  decreases 




The fact that a patent is commercialized will alternatively be included as a time-
dependent or a time-independent dummy. For example, the timing of commercialization 
                                                 
21 All these models will be run in the empirical part. Using likelihood-ratio tests, it is possible to decide 
which of the models best fits the data. 
  ) 4 ( ,




may be important for the renewal decision if the product, based on the patent, has a 
fixed  life-time.
22  The  commercialization  decision  is   then  represented  by  a  time -
dependent  additive  dummy,  COMT,  which  takes  on  a  value  of  1  once  the 
commercialization has started, and 0 otherwise. Alternatively, the commercialization 
decision signals, but does not change the nature of the patented idea. This could be the 
case if the quality of the patent explains both the commercialization and survival of the 
patent. COM is then measured as an additive dummy that takes on the value of 1 if the 
patent  is  commercialized,  and  0  otherwise.  The  expected  impact  on  the  hazard  of 
expiration is negative for both COMT and COM. 
The commercialization mode can be used instead of COMT. There are four main 
commercialization  modes  in  the  data  set:  acquired  patents,  licensed  patents, 
commercialization of the patent in the original firm or commercialization in a new firm. 
These  are  represented  by  the  four  time-dependent  additive  dummies  COMACQT, 
COMLICT,  COMORIGT  and  COMNEWT,  which  equal  1  when  the  associated 
commercialization mode starts and retain this value as long as the mode is present, and 
0 otherwise. If the mode of commercialization changes, which occurs in a total of 47 
cases  (see  Table  2),  the  dummy  variables  also  change  values.  In  both  cases,  the 
commercialization mode is expected to have a negative impact on the hazard of letting 
the patent expire. Thus, these patents should survive longer than non-commercialized 
patents. As in the case of COM, the mode variables will also be specified as additive 
(time-independent) dummies, measuring the first commercialization mode: COMACQ, 
COMLIC, COMORIG and COMNEW. The disadvantage of these variables is of course 
that they do not take account of the fact the mode may change over time. 
As shown in Table 6, acquired and licensed patents can instead be expressed as 
variables based on the contract terms. If the contract includes both variable and fixed 
fees  the  time-dependent  additive  dummy  ALVandFT  equals  1,  and  0  otherwise. 
Contracts  with  either  variable  or  fixed  fees  are  represented  by  the  time-dependent 
dummy ALVorFT. These variables equal 1 when the contract starts and retain this value 
as long as the contract is in force, and 0 otherwise. In line with the prior discussion, it is 
reasonable to expect ALVandFT to have a stronger negative impact on the hazard than 
                                                 
22 Imagine the case of a new product based on a patent, which has an expected life-time of five years. 
After the fifth year, the owner lets the patent expire. The timing of the start of commercialization will 
then be decisive for how long a time the patent survives.  
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ALVorFT, since the former group of contracts provides incentives for inventors and the 
external firm to exert effort during commercialization. 
In addition, a test is made of the performance of patents with contracts relying 
uniquely on variable fees and on fixed fees. The goal is to find out if it is the lack of 
fixed fees or the lack of variable fees which cause the possible failure of the external 
commercialization, and hence that the patent expires. ALonlyVT is a time dependent 
dummy which equals 1 when the licensing/acquisition contract including only variable 
fees starts and retains this value as long as the contract is in force, and 0 otherwise. 
Similarly, the time dependent dummy ALonlyVT takes on the value 1 for contracts with 
only fixed fees. ALonlyVT and ALonlyFT substitute for ALVorFT. I predict ALVandFT 
has a stronger negative impact on the hazard than both ALonlyVT and ALonlyFT. 
Keeping a patent for defensive purposes is the second main explanatory factor 
for the renewal decision, after commercialization. The additive dummy DEF equals 1 if 
the patent is not commercialized but retained as a defensive patent, and 0 otherwise. The 
expected impact on the hazard is negative, i.e. defensive patents should survive longer 
than  other  non-commercialized  patents.  When  interpreting  the  hazard  ratios  of  the 
commercialization  variables  and  DEF,  the  reference  group  is  always  non-
commercialized non-defensive patents.
23 
As an indicator of the quality of the patent, QUAL measures the total number of 
forward citations a patent and its patent equivalents have received during a five year 
period (as was used in section 3).
24 Self-citations are excluded. In the literature this kind 
of citation variable has been interpreted as an indicator of the quality of patents,  and is 




                                                 
23 Since a patent cannot take on the value of 1 for both DEF and COM, the hazard ratio for DEF will 
show the impact on the hazard compared to the reference group of other non-commercialized patents. By 
the same logic, the hazard ratio of COM will show the difference in hazards between commercialized and 
non-commercialized non-defensive patents. 
24 A patent equivalent is the same patent granted at a different patent office, e.g. EPO, USPTO. A patent 
which has a late application date on a verage will be cited fewer times than a patent with an early 
application date. Therefore, the citations in the present study are weighted by the number of days from the 
application date until November 2007. 
25  Trajtenberg (1990) shows that forward citations   indicate the social value of patents. The more 
frequently a patent is cited by later patents, the higher is the spillover effect and hence the social value of 
the cited patent. In the literature, forward citations have frequently been used as a measure of  patent 
quality or value, even though there is often skepticism about whether forward citations really measure 
patent value and / or spillover effects (Hall  et  al.  2007).  A  patent  can  be  cited  any  time  after  the 
application date, even after it has expired.  
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5.2 Control variables 
Control variables that may be correlated with the renewal scheme are included to test 
for robustness.  Firms  and individuals  may  have different  resources and patterns for 
renewing their patents, so additive dummies for different firm sizes are also included. 
FIRM1 is a dummy that takes on the value 1 for medium-sized firms with 101-1000 
employees, 0 otherwise. FIRM2 equals 1 for small firms with 11-100 employees, 0 
otherwise.  Finally,  FIRM3  takes  on  the  value  1  for  micro  companies  with  2-10 
employees, 0 otherwise. The firm group dummies relate here to the reference group of 
the individual inventors. 
The additive dummy  UNIV equals 1 for university patents, and 0 otherwise. 
SIMILAR is an additive dummy, which equals 1 if the inventors or applying firm have 
other  similar  patents  in  the  same  technology  area,  and  0  otherwise.  The  variable 
INVNMBR  measures  the  number  of  inventors  of  the  patent  at  hand.  Some  specific 
characteristics  of  the  inventors  are  also  included  in  the  model.  SEX  measures  the 
percentage  of  inventors  who  are  female.  It  might  represent  the  generalization  that 
women  are  more  or  less  risk  aversive  than  men.  ETH  measures  the  percentage  of 
inventors  who  belong  to  ethnic  minorities,  i.e.  immigrants  from  regions  other  than 
Western  Europe.  Many  immigrants  have  difficulty  landing  a  stable  job  in  Sweden, 
implying that they may have different commercialization and renewal strategies than 
others. 
Different  technologies  are  likely  to  be  associated  with  different  risks. 
Consequently, the probability of a patent expiring depends on the type of technology. 
Patents are divided into 30 technology categories by Breschi et al. (2004), groups based 
on the patents’ main IPC-Class.
26 The data is divided into six different kinds of regions 
according to NUTEK (1998):  Lar ge  city  regions, university  regions,  regions with 
important primary city centers, regions with secondary city centers, small regions with 
private employment, and small regions with government employment. Five additive 
dummies are included in the estimation s for these six groups. Additive dummies are 
also included for different application periods, to control for economic shocks that may 
affect all patents in a given  application period. The data has five application year 
                                                 
26 All technology categories are not represented in the data set, and some categories have inadequate 
observations.  Given  this  circumstance,  only  26  categories  and  25  additive  dummies  are  used  in  the 
present study. Technology classes with too few observations are merged with other closely related classes 
(Breschi et al. 2004).  
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periods (1985-90, 1991-92, 1993-94, 1995-96 and 1997-98) and four additive dummies 
are assigned for these periods.
27 
  Most of the explanatory variables described above are also included when 
estimating  the  commercialization  decision  in  equations  3  and  4.  S ome  additional 
variables,  earlier  found  to  be   correlated  with  the  commercialization  decision   in 
Svensson (2007), are included as instruments. The dummy KOMPL takes on the value 
of  1  if  complementary  patents  are  needed  for  commercialization,  and  0  otherwise. 
GOVFIN measures how large a  portion of the patent’s R&D-costs (in percent) was 
financed  through  government  capital.  A  positive  correlation  with  time  until 
commercialization starts is expected. The variable PRIVFIN shows the percent of the 
R&D costs that were financed through external private venture capital. There is also a 
third kind of external financing. OTHERFIN measures how large a portion of the R&D 
costs was financed through universities and research foundations.  
 
6. Empirical estimations 
6.1 Survival and Hazard functions  
Figure 1 shows the survival and hazard functions of the renewal decision, estimated by 
the Life-table method (Allison 1995). Since patents are not at risk of expiring until they 
have been granted, the patent grant year is normalized to 0. Year 1 is the first possible 
year when the patent can expire.
28 The survival function for all patents is declining from 
the outset, and declines increasingly faster with each passing year. The corresponding 
hazard function has an increasing trend.
29 When dividing the sample on commercialized 
and non-commercialized patents, the former group has a higher survival rate. Both Log-




                                                 
27 Time dummies for individual application years were also used, but within this specification one of the 
models failed to converge. Instead, I used time dummies for two-year periods. The usage of two-year 
periods does not alter the results for the other estimated parameters. Note that only one patent was applied 
for  in  1985  and  in  1986,  respectively,  and  no  patents  were  applied  for  during  the  1987-89  period. 
Therefore, 1985, 1986 and 1990 have been merged into a single group. 
28 The starting year is set to ei ther 1997 or 1998, depending on whether the grant date occurs before or 
after the annual renewal (application) date . Left-truncation is not possible when using the Life -table 
method. 
29 The survival and hazard functions are less reliable for the seventh yea r, since none of the patents 
starting in 1998 have a seventh year.   
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Similar  survival  and  hazard  functions  divided  on  cited  and  non-cited  patents  are 
depicted in Figure 2. Here, cited patents have a higher survival rate than non-cited ones, 
and Log-Rank and Wilcoxon tests show the difference is significant at the 1-percent 




6.2 Basic Cox proportional hazard estimations 
The results of the basic Cox survival model estimations are shown in Table 8. In order 
to test for robustness, several model specifications are estimated. In Model I, QUAL is 
included, but neither COMT nor DEF. In Model II, COMT and DEF are included but 
not QUAL. In Model III, all three main variables are included. As expected, all three 
variables have a negative and significant impact on the hazard. The size interpretation of 
the parameter estimate is that the hazard of expiration for commercialized patents is 
only  52  percent  of  the  hazard  for  non-commercialized  patents  (excluding  defensive 
patents). The hazard of expiration for defensive patents is only 24-27 percent of the 
hazard for other non-commercialized patents (in Models II-V). This is a stronger impact 
than that of commercialized patents. However, it is important to bear in mind that in this 
data set the number of commercialized patents exceeds those used as defensive patents 
in the dataset. Finally, the interpretation of QUAL is that one more forward citation 
during a five year period is associated with a 14 percent decrease of the hazard. 
What is even more interesting is that eliminating any of the main variables in 
Models I or II, compared to Model III, does not alter the significance levels or the 
hazard ratios. If COMT is endogenously determined by QUAL, one would expect the 
estimated parameters of COMT should change when QUAL is added or removed from 
the model (compare Models II and III). But it does not, which is an indication that 
endogenous interdependence between the main variables (EXPT, COMT and QUAL) is 
not  a  great  problem  in  the  estimations.  The  next  section  will  further  examine  this 
problem. Substituting COMT for COM in Models IV and V gives similar results. There 
are only minor changes in significance levels and hazard ratios, compared to Models II 
and III. Given these contrasts, it seems that specifying the commercialization decision 
as a time-independent or time-dependent dummy makes little sense. 
 




All firm size dummies have a negative and significant impact on the hazard of 
expiration. The larger the firm, the lower the probability that patents are left to expire. If 
the patent is owned by a medium-sized firm (FIRM1), a small firm (FIRM2) or a micro 
company (FIRM3), the hazard of expiration is around 76, 54 and 38 percent lower, 
respectively, than the hazard for patents owned by individuals (Model III). This finding 
is not surprising, since large firms have more resources and capabilities to exploit their 
patents, and also may be better able to judge their downstream potential  profitability.  
The only other significant control variable is OWNER, which also reduces the 
patent’s hazard of expiration. If the inventor’s ownership of the patent increases by 1 
percent,  then  the  hazard  of  expiration  decreases  by  0.6  percent.  This  result  raises 
questions about the accuracy of the signal when a patent is owned by its inventor for a 
long period of time. This duration might mean the patent is useful. On the other hand, 
one can readily imagine a psychological bias on behalf of inventors. External firms may 
have an easier time letting the patent expire, whereas  inventors  may  cling  onto  the 
patent in the hope/belief of having come up with an important invention. The results for 
the control variables are robust, as they are for later estimations (Tables 10-12). An 
attempt  to  include  additive  dummies  for  unique  owners  (firms/inventors)  in  the 
estimations did not yield results due to multicollinearity problems.
30 
 
6.3. Extensions with endogenous commercialization decision 
An objection against the model specification in the former section would be that both 
decisions of renewal and commercialization are taken by the owner, and thus could be 
endogenously determined by other factors in the model, as discussed above. I start by 
estimating how the commercialization decision depends on the quality of the patent and 
other factors. The specification of the AFT-model in Model VI in Table 9 builds on 
Svensson  (2007),  but  here  I  add  QUAL  as  an  explanatory  variable.  Three  different 
variants of Model VI are estimated, including different combinations of technology and 
region dummies. A negative (positive) parameter estimate in the AFT-model means an 
                                                 
30 Among the 867 patents in the sample, there are 740 unique owners (firms/inventors). 663 owners have 
only one commercialized patent in 1998, 54 owners have two patents, and only 23 owners have at least 
three patents. Dummies can only be assigned to the 54 owners with at least 2 patents. However, with the 
dummies for unique owners included, the models were characterized by severe multicollinearity problems 
with very large standard errors for these owner dummies. These problems persisted even after excluding 
all technology and region dummies and when dummies were included only for those 23 owners with at 
least three patents.  
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increase  in  the  explanatory  variable  causes  the  commercialization  decision  to  occur 
faster (slower), and thus increases (decreases) the probability of commercialization. A 
goodness-of-fit test showed that the log-logistic distribution of the residuals was  an 
appropriate choice of the AFT-model. 
  The results  show that if  QUAL is  high  commercialization occurs  faster.  If a 
patent  receives  an  additional  citation  during  a  five  year  period  in  Model  VI-c, 
commercialization occurs 32 percent faster.
31 Since the AFT-model is not a proportional 
hazard model,  a  quantitative  interpretation  of  the  estimated  parameters  can  only  be 
made in terms of survival time. The results of the other explanatory variables are almost 
identical  to  those  in  Svensson  (2007),  where  FIRM2,  FIRM3,  UNIV,  STATFIN  and 




An alternative specification is to estimate the commercialization decision as a 
pure dummy decision, and using a probit model as shown in Model VII. Here a positive 
(negative)  parameter  estimate  implies  that  an  increase  in  the  explanatory  variable 
increases (decreases) the probability the patent is commercialized. With respect to the 
significance levels of the estimated parameters of the explanatory variables, there are 
only minor differences between Models VI and VII. One more forward citation of the 
patent during a five year period is associated with an increase of the probability of 
commercialization with 4.3 percent units in Model VII-c. Of the estimations in Table 9, 
it is only in Model VI-a when technology dummies are excluded that QUAL does not 
exert any significant impact on COMT. 
  In  Table  10,  I  have  estimated  a  two-step  model  with  instrument  variable 
technique  for  COM,  as  described  in  section  4.3.  When  using  instrument  variable 
technique, the estimation results are usually sensitive to what kinds of instruments are 
chosen. Therefore, it is preferable to have many different instruments. The financing 
variables, KOMPL and QUAL are alternatively used as instruments.  
 
[Table 10] 
                                                 
31 The quantitative interpretation of the effect of the explanatory variables (also dummies) on survival 






Compared to the basic Cox estimations in Table 8, there are some differences. 
First, the predicted value of COM – pred(COM) – have a larger effect on the hazard 
(hazard ratio of 0.11-0.16 instead of 0.52), but is less significant as the standard errors 
increase.  The  latter  feature  is  common  for  instrumented  variables.  The  parameter 
estimate of pred(COM) is insignificant in Model X (although the Hazard ratio is as low 
as 0.32), but then only one instrument is used (KOMPL). Otherwise, the hazard ratios of 
pred(COM) are relatively robust – especially when many instruments are used (Models 
VIII, IX and XII). Second, the significant impacts of QUAL and DEF on the renewal 
decision in the Cox equation disappear. Thus, it seems like the quality of the patent 
affecting the renewal decision via COM. 
  The interpretation of the two-step estimations is as follows. Given the quality, 
commercialization of the patent gives the owner stronger incentives to retain the patent, 
as the product based on the patent needs protection. This is also one of the basic reasons 
why governments grant patents. 
 
6.4. Different commercialization modes 
In Table 11, the commercialization variable is divided into different commercialization 
modes.  When  using  time-dependent  dummies  in  Models  XIII  and  XIV,  all  modes 
except COMACQT have a significant and negative impact on the hazard. Thus, acquired 
patents do not survive significantly longer than non-commercialized ones. The hazard of 
expiration  for  patents  that  are  licensed,  commercialized  in  original  firms  and 
commercialized in new firms, respectively, is 50, 52 and 44 percent of the hazard for 




If measuring the mode variables as usual dummies instead in Models XVI and XVII, all 
modes  have  a  negative  and  significant  impact  on  the  hazard.  A  drawback  of  these 
estimations is that they only take account of the first commercialization choice. In the 
case of acquisitions, only 19 of 56 acquisitions are considered (see Table 4), since the 
commercialization  mode  may  change  over  time.  Furthermore,  different  modes  of 
commercialization start  at  different  time points  measured  from  the application date. 
Commercialization in the original firm starts on average 1.3 years after the application  
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date, commercialization in a new firm  after 2.1 years, licensing after 2.3 years and 
acquisition after 3.9 years. This clear pattern suggests time-dependent dummies are the 
appropriate way to measure the commercialization mode. 
  Turn now to the endogeneity problem of the commercialization mode variables. 
When only one variable (COM) is endogenous and needs to be instrumented, it is not 
impossible to handle the problem, as seen in the former section. However, here four 
variables (COMACQ, COMLIC, COMORIG and COMNEW) need to be explained in a 
first step (equation 4) by almost the same explanatory variables. The predicted dummy 
variables should then be inserted in equation (2). Such a two-step estimation would 
simply collapse. 
  In such a situation, the most feasible robustness test I can undertake is to remove 
variables from the Cox model that likely determine the commercialization mode. QUAL 
is  such  an  explanatory  variable,  as  well  as  firm  size  dummies.  Table  4  shows  the 
commercialization mode is strongly related to firm size. Removing QUAL in Models 
XIII  and  XVI  does  not  alter  the  significance  levels  or  hazard  ratios  of  the  mode 
variables. When the firm size dummies are removed in Model XV, the results for the 
mode variables barely change. 
 
6.5. Different contract terms of acquired and licensed patents 
In Models XVIII-XXI (Table 12), the effects of acquired/licensed patents with both 
variable  and  fixed  fees  (ALVandFT),  and  those  with  either  variable  or  fixed  fees 
(ALVorFT)  on  the  hazard  are  shown.  As  expected,  ALVandFT  has  a  negative  and 
significant impact on the hazard of patent expiration. Combining variable and fixed fees 
provides incentives to both inventors and the external firm to exert effort during the 
commercialization process. The risk of expiration decreases by about 61 percent for 
ALVandFT  compared  to  non-commercialized  patents  (Model  XVIII),  However, 
ALVorFT does not appear to have any significant effect whatsoever on the hazard. This 
suggest  patents  whose  contracts  include  both  variable  and  fixed  fees  have  a  better 
chance of renewal and in the long run commercial success. Although the hazard ratio 
between ALVandFT and ALVorFT is relatively large (around 0.50), the difference is 




32 Thus, there is no conclusive evidence that it is better to include in the contracts 




Similar Cox estimations, in which acquired/licensed patents with only variable 
fees (ALonlyVT) and only fixed fees (ALonlyFT) are substituted for (ALVorFT), are 
shown in Models XXII and XXIII. Neither ALonlyVT nor ALonlyFT alone have any 
statistically  significant  impact  on  the  hazard  of  patent  expiration.  Furthermore,  the 
difference between their parameter estimates and the parameter estimate of ALVandFT 
is never statistically significant. Estimations here with time-independent dummies of the 
contract variables are rather pointless, as we would lose 43 acquired/licensed patents 
(out of 108) that have changed commercialization mode (see Table 4).  
  However, as the earlier discussion of commercialization modes point out, the 
contract terms are likely endogenously determined by QUAL and other variables in the 
model. For example, if there are problems with asymmetric information between the 
patent owner and the external firm, the patent owner can signal high quality of the 
patent  by  offering  a  contract  that  includes  variable  fees  (Gallini  and  Wright  1990, 
Kamien 1992). Thus, the contracts terms should depend on the quality of the patent. The 
results of Table 12 should therefore be taken with a degree of caution.  
To  instrument  all  the  commercialization  variables  (ALVandFT,  ALVorFT, 
COMORIGT and COMNEWT) in a first step in similar ways simply does not work. The 
best I can do is to remove variables that likely determine the contract terms and observe 
how the other parameters are affected. QUAL is removed in Models XIX and XXIII, but 
the results for ALVandFT and ALVorFT are hardly impacted at all. In Models XX and 
XXI, the firm dummies and other control variables are removed, but the results for the 
main variables are still robust. 
 
7. Concluding remarks 
One of the main reasons why governments award patents to inventors is to encourage 
R&D investments and commercialization of inventions. Other reasons are to disclose 
and  diffuse  new  knowledge,  and  facilitate  licensing  and  ownership  contracts  of 
                                                 
32 It is likely that this lack of statistical significance is due to the small sample size.  ALVandFT and 
ALVorFT equal 1 for only 37 and 66 observations, respectively.  
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knowledge.  If  the  patent  owner  commercializes  his  invention,  then  he  has  stronger 
incentives to hold on to the patent. However, inventors also file and retain patents for 
defensive, non-innovative reasons such as protecting other similar patents or deterring 
competitors  from  utilizing  the  invention.  The  purpose  of  the  present  study  was  to 
empirically analyze the relationship between commercialization and renewal of patents. 
At the same time, I sought to take into account defensive strategies for keeping patents 
and if a third factor like quality of the patent affects the commercialization and renewal 
decisions in the same direction. To the best of my knowledge this report breaks new 
ground in empirically investigating how the commercialization decision is related to the 
renewal decision for patents. 
To  estimate  the  renewal  of  patents  a  detailed  database  on  Swedish  patents 
owned  by  individuals  and  small  firms  was  used.  Basic  results  show  that 
commercialization and defensive strategies increase the probability that the patent is 
renewed.  The  hazard  of  patent  expiration  for  commercialized  patents  is  48  percent 
lower  than  the  hazard  for  non-commercialized  patents.  Moreover,  pure  defensive 
patents reduce the hazard of patent expiration by more than 70 percent compared to 
other non-commercialized patents. However, there are only a small number of defensive 
patents in the sample. This suggests commercialization rather than defensive strategies 
matters the most for patent renewal, at least among small firms and individual inventors. 
But the results also show that the quality of the patent influences the commercialization 
and renewal decisions in the same direction. Thus, the commercialization decision is 
likely endogenous in the model. 
When  controlling  for  endogenous  commercialization  decision  by  using 
instrument  variable  techniques,  there  is  still  a  strong  positive  relationship  between 
commercialization  and  renewal  of  patents.  In  fact,  the  negative  impact  of 
commercialization on the hazard of expiration is then even stronger (now 80-85 percent 
lower  than  for  non-commercialized  patents),  but  the  significance  level  diminishes 
somewhat. Thus, given the quality of the patent, if the owner decides to commercialize 
the patent on the margin, this is associated with a longer duration of the patent. 
With regard to commercialization modes, there is some evidence that licensed 
patents and those commercialized in original and new firms – but not acquired patents – 
survive longer than non-commercialized patents. Looking more closely at the contracts 
of acquired and licensed patents, it seems like contracts with both variable and fixed 
fees – but not contracts with either variable or fixed fees – survive longer than non- 
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commercialized patents. This is in line with previous theoretical studies, though none of 
them empirically tested the generalization. The intuition here is that both the inventor 
and the external firm have incentives to make an effort during commercialization when 
the  contract  includes  both  fees.  Excluding  any  of  the  fees  causes  moral  hazard 
problems. However, the analysis about commercialization modes and contract terms 
does not take into account the endogeneity problem, meaning a cautious attitude to the 
latter results is wise.  
  A fundamental limitation of the present study is that the data set only included 
patents  owned  by  small  firms  and  individuals.  Defensive  patent  strategies  are 
undoubtedly applied far more frequently by larger firms. This should be investigated in 
future  research  where  data  is  available.  The  estimates  are  also  based  on  Swedish 
patents, but there is no obvious reason to suspect that if data had been used from another 
country the results would differ. It is probable a data set with patents owned by large 
firms would impact the results more than the country of origin of the patent owners. 
Another  important  limitation  is  that  the  empirical  analysis  of  how 
commercialization modes and contract terms relate to the renewal decision suffers from 
endogeneity problems. For example, the licensor can signal a high value of the patent 
by offering a contract which relies heavily on variable fees and thus requires low fixed 
payments if the patent is useless. Thus, the contract terms would be a function of the 
quality of the patent. However, this is not at all easy to get a handle on inasmuch as 
several (at least four) variables need to be instrumented in a similar way. This is a 
complex puzzle to solve in future work. 
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Figure 1. Survival and Hazard functions for the renewal of 























Figur 2. Survival and Hazard functions for the renewal of 























Table 1. Commercialization and renewal of patents across firm sizes.  
Number of patents and percent. 
 









Medium-sized firms (101-1000 employees)  116  66 %  76 % 
Small firms (11-100 employees)  201  68 %  63 % 
Micro companies (2-10 employees)  142  74 %  61 % 
Individuals (1-4 inventors)  408  51 %  44 % 
Total  867  61 %  56 % 
 
 
Table 2. Commercialized patents and patents still alive in 2004. Number of patents 
and percent 
 
Patents still alive in 2004 
Patents latest commercialized in 2003   
Percent 
Commercialized  Yes  No  Total 
Yes  340  142  482  71 % 
No  186  199  385  48 % 
Total  526  341  867  61 % 
Percent still alive  65 %  42 %  56 %   
Note: Chi-square-value is 44.32, significant at the 1 percent level for 1 d.f.  
 
 
Table 3. Forward citations, commercialization and renewal. Number of patents. 
  Patents latest 
commercialized in 2003  Patents still alive in 2004   
Total 
No. of forward citations  Yes  No  Yes  No 
    0  284  233  246  271  517 
    1    95    48    94    49  143 
    2    49    17    45    21    66 
    3    30    13    29    14    43 
    4    23    10    23    10    33 
    5    13      7    17      3    20 
    6      7      4      6      5    11 
    7      8      1      5      4      9 
  > 7    17      8    17      8    25 
Total  526  341  482  385  867 
No. of citations per 
patent  1.39  0.95  1.47  0.90  1.22 
Differences between 
means, t-statistics  2.73 ***  3.26 ***  ------ 
No. of citations per 
patent and 5-year period   0.57  0.39  0.61  0.36  0.50 
Differences between 
means, t-statistics  2.72 ***  4.72 ***  ------ 
Note:  Self-citations  are  excluded  from  forward  citations.  Forward  citations  are  measured  from  the 





Table 4. Commercialization mode across firm types. Number of patents. 
 
Kind of firm where the 
invention was created 
Commercialization mode – first choice 
Total 
Acquired  Licensing  Original firm  New firm 
Medium-sized firms    0    0    77    0    77 
Small firms    2    2  133    0  137 
Micro companies    4    7    93    1  105 
Inventors  13  37    87  70  207 
Total  19  46  390  71  526 
 
 
Kind of firm where the 
invention was created 
Commercialization mode – second choice 
Total 
Acquired  Licensing  Original firm  New firm 
Medium-sized firms    4  0  0  1    5 
Small firms    8  0  0  1    9 
Micro companies    5  6  0  2  13 
Inventors  20  0  0  0  20 
Total  37  6  0  4  47 
 
 
Table 5. Renewal and quality of patents across modes of commercialization. 
Number of patents and forward citations, percent and years. 
  Commercialization mode 
  Acquired  Licensing  Original firm  New firm 
Still alive in 2004  32  34  272  49 
Expired  24  18  118  26 
Total  56  52  390  75 
% expired  43 %  35 %  30 %  35 % 
Years until expired 
a  2.8  3.9  5.4  4.3 
No. of forward citations 
per patent 
1.16  2.12  1.39  1.20 
Differences between 
means, t-statistics 
No significant difference between any two means 
No. of citations per 
patent and 5-year period  
0.48  0.79  0.58  0.51 
Differences between 
means, t-statistics 
No significant difference between any two means 
Note:
 Self-citations are excluded from forward citations. Forward citations are measured from the 
application date to November 2007.
 










Table  6.  Renewal  and  quality  of  acquired  and  licensed  patents  with  different 
contract terms. Number of patents and forward citations, percent and years. 
  Acquired/licensed patents with 
Fixed and  
variable fees 
Fixed or  
variable fees  Only fixed fees  Only variable fees 
Acquired    8  48  48    0 
Licensed  30  22    0  22 
Total  38  70  48  22 
Still alive in 2004  28  38  27  11 
Expired  10  32  21  11 
Total  38  70  48  22 
% expired  26 %  46 %  44 %  50 % 
Years until expired 
a  3.7  3.2  2.9  3.7 
No. of forward citations 
per patent 
1.73  1.54  0.98  2.73 
Differences between 
means, t-statistics 
0.25  -----  ---- 
No. of citations per 
patent and  5-year period  
0.70  0.59  0.41  0.95 
Differences between 
means, t-statistics 
0.44  ----  ---- 
Note:
 The column with fixed or variable fees is a sum of the last two columns. Self-citations are excluded 
from forward citations. Forward citations are measured from the application date to November 2007.
 




Table 7. Descriptive statistics and hypotheses for the explanatory variables. 




QUAL  Number of forward citations that the patent has received per five-
year period 
0.50  1.00  - 











Time-dependent dummy that equals 1 when the patent is 
commercialized and 0 otherwise. 
Time-dependent dummy that equals 1 when the patent is acquired, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Time-dependent dummy that equals 1 when the patent is licensed, 
and 0 otherwise. 
Time-dependent dummy that equals 1 when the patent is 
commercialized in the original firm and 0 otherwise. 
Time-dependent dummy that equals 1 when the patent is 





































Time-dependent dummy that equals 1 when the acquired/ licensed 
patent includes variable and fixed fees, and 0 otherwise. 
Time-dependent dummy that equals 1 when the acquired/ licensed 
patent includes variable or fixed fees, and 0 otherwise. 
Time-dependent dummy that equals 1 when the patent is acquired 
/ licensed and includes only variable fees, and 0 otherwise. 
Time-dependent dummy that equals 1 when the patent is acquired 


































Dummy that equals 1 if the patent is commercialized and 0 
otherwise. 
Dummy that equals 1 if the patent is acquired, and 0 otherwise 
(only first choice). 
Dummy that equals 1 if the patent is licensed, and 0 otherwise 
(only first choice). 
Dummy that equals 1 if the patent is commercialized in the 
original firm, and 0 otherwise (only first choice). 
Dummy that equals 1 if the patent is commercialized in a new 




























DEF  Dummy that equals 1 if the patent is a pure defensive patent, and 
0 otherwise 







Dummy taking the value of 1 for medium-sized firms (101-1000 
employees), and 0 otherwise. 
Dummy taking the value of 1 for small firms (11-100 employees), 
and 0 otherwise. 
Dummy taking the value of 1 for micro companies (2-10 



















Dummy that equals 1 for university patents, and 0 otherwise. 
Dummy taking the value of 1 if the inventors have more similar 
(competitive) patents. 
Number of inventors of the patent.  
Percent of the patent owned by the inventors. 
Share of inventors who are females 
Share  of  inventors  with  an  ethnical  background  other  than 






















Dummy that equals 1 if complementary patents are needed to 
create a product, and 0 otherwise 
Percent of R&D financed by government 
Percent of R&D financed by private venture capital 












Note: A “T” in the end of the variable denotation indicates a time-dependent dummy variable.  
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Table 8. Basic Cox estimations of the renewal decision. 
Dependent variable: EXPT  Statistical model: Cox proportional hazard model with left-truncation 













































































































Note: The total number of observations is 867, 482 of which are right-censored. The estimated figures are 
hazard ratios. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Region, 





Table 9. Estimations of the commercialization decision. 
Dependent variable  COMT  COM 














































































































































Note: The total number of observations is 867. 337 are right-censored in the AFT model. ***, ** and * 
indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Region, technology and time dummies 
























Table 10. Extended Cox Model of the renewal decision with endogenous 
commercialization. 
Model  Model VIII  Model 
IX 





COM  EXPT  EXPT  COM  EXPT  EXPT  COM  EXPT 




st step  2
nd step  2
nd step  1
st step  2
nd step  2
nd step  1

































































































































































































Note: The total number of observations is 867, 482 of which are right-censored in the Cox model. Models 
VIII and IX have identical 1
st step probit model specifications. This is also the case for Models X and XI. 
The estimated figures in the Cox model are hazard ratios. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 
and 10 percent level, respectively. Region, technology and time dummies are not shown, but are available 
from the author upon request.  
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Statistical model: Cox proportional hazard model with left-truncation 

















































































































































Note: The total number of observations is 867, 482 of which are right-censored. The estimated figures are 
hazard ratios. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Region, 







Table 12. Cox estimations of the renewal decision with different contract terms for 
acquired and licensed patents. 
Dependent variable: 
EXPT 
Statistical model: Cox hazard model with left-truncation 
























































































































































Hazard ratios between different groups 
ALVandFT / ALVorFT 
ALVandFT / ALonlyVT 

































Note: The total number of observations is 867, 482 of which are right-censored. The estimated figures are 
hazard ratios. ***, ** and * indicate significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively. Region, 
technology and time dummies are not shown, but are available from the author upon request. 
 